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Abstract—Cyber threats in Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems have the potential to render 
physical damage and jeopardize power system operation, safety 
and stability. SCADA systems were originally designed with 
little consideration of escalating cyber threats and hence the 
problem of how to develop robust intrusion detection 
technologies to tailor the requirements of SCADA is an 
emerging topic and a big challenge. This paper proposes a 
stateful Intrusion Detection System (IDS) using a Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI) method to improve the cyber-security of 
SCADA systems using the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol which is 
tailored for basic telecontrol communications. The proposed 
stateful protocol analysis approach is presented that is designed 
specifically for the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol. Finally, the novel 
intrusion detection approach are implemented and validated. 
Index Terms--SCADA, Cyber-security, Intrusion detection, IEC 
60870-5-104. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems have long played a critical role in power system 
operation and communications. The increasing standardization 
and interconnection of SCADA systems in Smart Grids 
potentially widens the prospect of cyber attacks from 
malicious sources. Furthermore, cyber-security aspects have 
not generally been considered during the design phase of most 
SCADA networks. Therefore, SCADA systems could be 
compromised by malicious attackers or disgruntled employees 
via unauthorized access at vulnerable points. Such intrusion 
has the potential to render simple or elaborate attacks which 
may jeopardize the system operation and which may 
ultimately lead to severe physical damage (e.g., the first-ever 
sophisticated control system malware, Stuxnet [1]). The 
marriage of new cyber technology to traditional control 
systems creates an environment where cyber and physical 
assets interact in ways never envisaged or planned for in most 
power control systems. Protecting SCADA systems from 
cyber threats is therefore a pertinent topic and of immediate 
relevance to modern power systems and smarter grids.  
Currently, a number of open international standards exist 
in SCADA systems of the electrical power, such as 
Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3), IEC 60870-
5 series, and IEC 61850. For example, the IEC 60870-5-104 
transmission protocol [2] presents network access for IEC 
60870-5-101 [3] based on Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), which can be utilized for 
basic telecontrol tasks in SCADA systems. However, the IEC 
60870-5-104 protocol transmits messages in clear text without 
any authentication mechanism [4]. Furthermore, the IEC 
60870-5-104 protocol is based on TCP/IP which also has 
cyber-security issues itself. (IEC/104 is used as the notation, 
instead of IEC 60870-5-104 in the remainder of the paper.) 
In related research, the authors [4] have previously 
implemented signature-based and model-based detection 
approaches using Snort to improve the cyber-security of 
SCADA systems using the IEC/104 protocol. The research 
presented in this paper enhances the previous work by 
deriving a stateful protocol analysis approach to create a 
stateful Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for IEC/104 
SCADA systems. 
Stateful protocol analysis is a common and effective 
detection methodology that operates by comparing 
predetermined profiles of acceptable protocol behaviors for 
protocol states against observed activities to detect deviations 
and misbehaviors [5]. “Stateful” means that the IDS is able to 
identify and track the states of network, transport, or 
application protocols that have a concept of state. Stateful 
protocol analysis of SCADA can be performed in order to 
ensure proper use of protocols, compliance with protocol 
standards, and can be used to detect anomalous 
communications, which may include packet injection, replay 
attacks and data manipulation. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines for industrial 
control systems recommend stateful inspection for standard IT 
firewalls to evaluate packet contents at the transport layer. 
This enables tracking of active sessions in order to determine 
whether session packets are legitimate. NIST further 
recommends additional rule sets for SCADA applications [6].  
Towards this aim, this paper proposes a model using state 
machines that analyze and track IEC/104 protocol state 
transitions in the application layer communications. This 
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enables validation of communications via the protocol, for the 
purpose of supporting intrusion detection in the SCADA 
system.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Using IDS in SCADA networks is a relatively new 
concept. Some research has been conducted and applied in 
intrusion detection approaches for certain SCADA systems, 
such as signature-based, anomaly-based, model-based 
intrusion detection methods, as well as other SCADA-specific 
IDSs [4], [7]-[11]. However, research in this cross-disciplinary 
cyber-physical context, especially for stateful detection in 
SCADA systems, still has a long way to go. 
Stateful protocol analysis is a typical detection 
methodology in IT security [5]. Y. Al-Nashif et al. [12] adopt 
the protocol behavior analysis approach as part of a multi-
level IDS, which only describes TCP state behaviors in the 
transport layer by Finite State Machines (FSM). However, a 
recent survey has shown that approximately 80% of cyber 
attacks originate in the application layer [13]. H. Sengar et al. 
[14] present a protocol state machine based IDS for Voice 
over IP (VoIP), which identifies any deviation from normal 
protocol behaviors, and hence, could detect unknown attacks. 
P. Truong et al. [15] also propose an FSM based intrusion 
detection model for H.323-based VoIP. In [16], state machines 
based intrusion detection is proposed for Advanced Metering 
Infrastructures (AMI) in Smart Grids that includes the device-
level state machine for smart meters and the application-level 
state machine for the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) C12.22 protocol. However, there is little published 
literature which rigorously considers stateful intrusion 
detection for SCADA protocols. To this end, by exploiting an 
in-depth protocol analysis and a DPI method, a stateful 
intrusion detection approach for IEC/104 driven SCADA 
systems is proposed in this paper. 
III. STATEFUL PROTOCOL ANALYSIS BASED DETECTION 
The stateful protocol analysis based detection uses a 
whitlelist methodology, which means it identifies any 
abnormal packets that violate the predefined protocol state 
behaviors. 
In practical Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack scenarios 
[4], it is difficult to completely block normal communication 
between clients and servers and replace it solely with 
malicious data. However, it can be relatively simple to inject a 
false packet into the normal communication connection (e.g., 
by a TCP hijacking attack). In this context, a stateful IDS must 
be able to identify any abnormal packet that violates the 
predefined state diagrams.  
Finite State Machines (FSM) provide an effective 
methodology to describe dynamic behaviors of reactive 
systems [17]. A communication protocol is one of the 
common examples of such systems. For example, the IEC/104 
protocol can be designed and implemented by an FSM. This 
paper proposes a novel stateful detection approach using a 
Detection State Machine (DSM) based on the concept of the 
FSM. 
A. Detection State Machine 
Definition 1: A Detection State Machine (DSM) D is a 
sixtuple: 
 ( ) ,  , , , , AD S G A T S= Σ  (1) 
where :  
• S is a finite set of protocol states, including the start 
state and final state. 
• Σ is an event alphabet of the DSM. 
• G is a set of guard conditions on transitions.  
• A is a finite tuple (a1, a2, …, an) of transition actions, 
including entry action and exit action. 
• T is a transition relation: S × Σ × G → (S, A). 
• SA is a set of alarm states ( 1 2, , ..., na a as s s ) of the DSM. 
Each transition t in the transition relation set T (t ∈T) is a 
quintuple <ss, e, g, st, a >, where ss, st ∈ S are the source and 
the target states of the transition respectively, e ∈ Σ is an 
event that is an input message to the source state, g ∈ G is a 
guard condition on the transition which is a Boolean 
expression that must be true for the transition to be taken, and 
a ∈ A defines an action to be performed by the state machine, 
which is associated with the transition or with entering or 
exiting a specific state. The basic state transition unit is 
shown in Fig. 1, which is the fundamental element to 
constitute specific state machines in practical applications. 
 
Figure 1.  The basic state transition unit. 
In comparison with conventional FSMs, the presented 
DSM introduces the concept of a set of alarm states SA. When 
any protocol misbehavior occurs that deviates from the state 
machines based on the protocol specification, the DSM will be 
trigged and the state will transfer to an alarm state sa (sa ∈ SA). 
B. Proposed Stateful IDS for IEC/104 
Following an in-depth analysis of the behaviors of the 
IEC/104 protocol, a stateful IDS is proposed for intrusion 
detection in IEC/104 SCADA systems. The main idea is to 
develop and deploy the stateful IDS to monitor the 
communication traffic between the IEC/104 client and the 
server. The stateful IDS uses DFM not only to describe the 
important and normal protocol behaviors in the form of state 
transitions, but also to detect protocol misbehaviors in the 
form of alarm states, as shown in Fig. 2. The detection 
function is performed by state transition analysis of the DFM. 
In the detection state diagram, the current state together with 
the captured and parsed IEC/104 packet will determine the 
normal state transition (update or keep the current state) or 
the abnormal alarm state. As a whitelist methodology, the 
DFM based IDS can detect deviations from normal state 
transitions, and hence, detect unknown attacks. 
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Figure 2.  The detection state diagram for IEC/104 stateful IDS. 
In Fig. 2, the yellow rectangles represent normal states 
which are defined according to TCP connection states, APCI 
information, and the states of the client, as described in Table 
I. The states named A_1 – A_8 represent the alarm states. The 
lines with arrows stand for transitions. There are two kinds of 
events in Fig. 2: packet-capturing events and time events, as 
shown in Table II. The packet-capturing events are described 
based on the arrival of packets. For example, an APDU_I 
event means arrival of an I format APDU packet. A time event 
will occur when a timer is overtime. For example, an After_t2 
event is triggered after timer 2 is overtime. 
In terms of actions in Fig. 2, Set_flag means setting a flag 
for a guard condition; Set_timer1, Set_timer2 and Set_timer3 
stand for setting timer 1, timer 2 and time 3 for corresponding 
time event, respectively; Update_state is to update a state. The 
guard conditions are explained in Table III. The constants 
referred to in the proposed DSM for IEC/104 are described in 
Table IV. 
TABLE I.  THE NORMAL STATE TABLE 
No. State name Remarks 
1 Disconnected 
No TCP connection between a client 
and a server 
2 TCP_Connected 
A TCP connection has been established 
between a client and a server 
3 STARTDT Start data transfer 
4 Client_Tx_APDU_I A client sends an I format APDU 
5 Client_Rx_APDU_I A client receives an I format APDU 
6 Client_Tx_APDU_S A client sends an S format APDU 
7 Client_Rx_APDU_S A client receives an S format APDU 
8 TESTER Periodical connection test procedure 
9 STOPDT Stop data transfer 
TABLE II.  THE EVENT TABLE 
Event name Remarks 
APDU_I The arrival of an I format APDU packet 
APDU_S The arrival of an S format APDU packet 
After_t1_s3 Time event, after t1_s3 is overtime 
After_t1_s8 Time event, after t1_s8 is overtime 
After_t1_s9 Time event, after t1_s9 is overtime 
After_t2 Time event, after t2 is overtime 
After_t3_s2 Time event, after t3_s2 is overtime 
After_t3_s3 Time event, after t3_s3 is overtime 
After_t3_s6 Time event, after t3_s6 is overtime 
I_RC_RA The arrival of a remote command or remote  
adjustment packet 
TCP_connection TCP three-way handshake 
U_STARTDT_act The arrival of a START act packet  
U_STARTDT_con The arrival of a START con packet  
U_STOPDT_act The arrival of a STOPDT act packet  
U_STOPDT_con The arrival of a STOPDT con packet  
U_TESTER_act The arrival of a TESTER act packet  
U_TESTER_con The arrival of a TESTER con packet  
TABLE III.  THE GUARD CONDITION TABLE 
Guard condition Remarks 
flowDir == C2S 
The flow direction is from a client to a 
server 
flowDir == S2C 
The flow direction is from a server to a 
client 
Flag_U_STARTDT_con==0 No receiving a STARTDT con packet 
Flag_U_TESTER_con==0 No receiving a TESTER con packet 
t3_s2 > T3 Timer t3 of the state 2 is overtime 
t3_s3 > T3 Timer t3 of the state 3 is overtime 
t3_s6 > T3 Timer t3 of the state 6 is overtime 
t3_s7 > T3 Timer t3 of the state 7 is overtime 
Disconnected
TCP_Connected
STARTDT
STOPDT
Entry /  Set_timer1()
TESTER
Entry /  Set_timer1()
Client_Tx_APDU_I
Client_Rx_APDU_S Client_Tx_APDU_S
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 /
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[flowDir==C2S] / Update_state()
? /
U_STARTDT_con()
[flowDir == S2C] /
Set_timer3() Set_flag()
After_t1_s3()
[Flag_U_STARTDT_con == 0] /
Update_state()
APDU_I()
[flowDir==C2S] /
Update_state()
U_TESTER_act() [t3_s3>T3]
[flowDir==C2S] / Update_state()
? /
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[flowDir==S2C] /
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[flowDir==C2S] / Update_state()
? /
APDU_I()
[flowDir==S2C] /
Update_state()
APDU_I()
[flowDir==C2S] /
Update_state() U_TESTER_act()
[t3_s6>T3]
[flowDir==C2S] /
Update_state()
? /
APDU_I() [flowDir==C2S] /
Update_state()
U_STOPDT_act()
[flowDir==C2S] /
Update_state() APDU_I()
[flowDir==S2C] /
After_t2() /
Update_state()
APDU_S()
[flowDir==C2S] /
Update_state()
? /
TABLE IV.  THE CONSTANT TABLE 
Constant 
name 
Default 
value Remarks 
C2S  1 From a client to a server 
S2C  0 From a server to a client 
T0  30 (s) Time-out of connection establishment 
T1  15 (s) Time-out of send or test APDUs 
T2  10 (s) 
Time-out for acknowledgements in case of 
no data messages T2 < T1 
T3  20 (s) 
Time-out for sending test frames in case of 
a long idle state 
 
The variables used in Fig. 2 are shown as follows: 
Flag_U_STARTDT_con or Flag_U_TESTER_con is a flag of 
capturing a STARTDT con or TESTER con packet, 
respectively; flowDir and flowID mean the direction and the 
identifier of a flow, respectively; tm_sn is timer tm of the 
state n, for example, t1_s3 means timer t1 of the state 3; t2 
stands for timer t2. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION  
Due to the requirements of the DSM, it is not easily 
feasible to implement using Snort. The proposed stateful IDS 
is therefore implemented using the Internet Traffic and 
Content Analysis (ITACA) tool. ITACA [18] is a software 
platform for traffic sniffing and real-time IP network analysis 
which has been developed by the Center for Secure 
Information Technologies (CSIT) at Queen’s University 
Belfast. The extendable and flexible analysis tool enables the 
implementation of plug-ins to perform specific tasks, e.g., 
intrusion detection. The detailed modules and functions of the 
ITACA architecture are described in [18]. In this paper, the 
Stateful Protocol Analysis (SPA) module in the stateful IDS 
plug-in is developed in C/C++ using the ITACA platform, as 
shown in Fig. 3.  
ss
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Figure 3. The ITACA based implement of the proposed stateful IDS 
The detailed implementation steps are as follows. 
1) The ITACA core captures, extract, parse and analyse 
the raw IEC/104 packets in order to provide all possible 
information for the stateful IDS plug-in. 
2) The DSM, as presented in Section III and described in 
Fig. 2, is implemented within a new stateful IDS plug-in.  
3) Based on each captured IEC/104 packet and the 
current state read from the state memory, the DSM will 
determine whether the state transition is normal or abnormal. 
If it is abnormal, the stateful detection module will generate 
an alert notification and record the detection result in the log 
file. 
For example, when the current state is TCP_Connected, 
the DSM will execute, as illustrated by part of the DSM 
program shown in Fig. 4.  
CurrentState = StateMemory.state;  
switch (CurrentState) 
{ 
  case TCP_Connected:     
  { 
    if((packet->payload == U_STARTDT_act)&&(packet 
->flowDir == C2S)) 
    { 
      StateMemory.state = STARTDT; 
      t1_s3 = packet->packet_time; 
    } 
    else if((packet->payload == I_RC_RA)&&(packet 
    ->flowDir == C2S))   
    { 
      StateMemory.state = Client_Tx_APDU_I; 
    } 
    else if ((packet->payload == U_TESTER_act) &&   
    (packet->flowDir == C2S) && (t3_s2 > T3)) 
    { 
      StateMemory.state = TESTER; 
      t1_s8= packet->packet_time; 
    } 
    else   
    { 
      alert(); 
    }  
  }  
  break;  
  … 
} 
Figure 4.  A portion of the pseudo codes of the stateful detection module 
First, the current state (TCP_Connected) is read from 
the state memory (StateMemory.state).  
Second, the DSM executes switch statements to determine 
the state transition according to the arrived packet and the 
current state. If the captured packet is a START act packet 
(packet->payload==U_STARTDT_act) and the flow 
direction is from the client to the server (packet-
>flowDir==C2S), the state memory is updated to the state 3 
(STARTDT) and meanwhile the timer t1 of the state 3 is set. 
When the arrived packet is a remote command or remote 
adjustment packet (packet->payload==I_RC_RA) in the 
control direction (packet->flowDir==C2S), the updated 
state is Client_Tx_APDU_I. If a TESTER act packet 
(U_TESTER_act) in the control direction arrives and the 
timer t3 of the state 2 is overtime (t3_s2 > T3), the next 
state is the state 8 (TESTER) and the timer t1 of the state 8 is 
set.  
Finally, other misbehavior packets will call the alert 
function that generates and records the alarm messages. 
In all, 8 stateful detection rules for IEC/104 are 
implemented in the proposed stateful IDS. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
A. Experiment 
An experimental process was developed as follows. 
1) The normal IEC/104 traffic was obtained from the 
commercial source (a mirrored SCADA test-bed in a power 
company). Abnormal packets were generated by modifying 
the captured data or by injecting new malicious packets in the 
pre-captured Packet Capture (PCAP) file. 
2) The PCAP file was read by ITACA core that extracts 
and interprets all available information for the SCADA-IDS 
plug-in. The IEC/104 packets were monitored and detected 
by the developed stateful IDS plug-in, as mentioned in 
Section III.B.  
3) The detection results were displayed and recorded into 
a log file. 
B. Results 
In the experiment, there were 116497 packets with 28 
abnormal packets in the PCAP file, and wherein the number 
of abnormal packets violating SPA was 28. It is apparent from 
the experimental results that the proposed stateful IDS 
effectively identifies all the abnormal data with zero false 
positive for the given deterministic rules. 
The message format in the log file is defined referring to 
RFC 3164 as follows:  
<SEVERITY> TIMESTAMP DEVICE_NAME 
DEVICE_TYPE ALERT_TYPE EVENT_DESCRIPTION 
SRC_IP SRC_PORT DST_IP DST_PORT 
In this case SEVERITY represents alert severity which is 
described by numerical code, e.g., 0, 1 and 2 stand for 
HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW, respectively. The TIMESTAMP 
field is the local time and is in the format of “YYYY-MM-DD 
HH:MM:SS”. DEVICE_NAME means the name or IP address 
of specific security device. DEVICE_TYPE is the type of the 
security device, e.g., IDS. ALERT_TYPE represents alert 
event type which is violated such as SPA. 
EVENT_DESCRIPTION describes the detailed information of 
specific security event. SRC_IP, SRC_PORT, DST_IP and 
DST_PORT are source IP address, source port, destination IP 
address and destination port, respectively. 
As described in Fig. 5, the SCADA-IDS alert messages 
show that abnormal packets in the states TCP_Connected, 
STARTDT and Client_Tx_APDU_I are identified, which 
violate the detection rules SPA-1, SPA-2 and SPA-3, 
respectively. Other detection results have also been recorded 
in the log file using the unified format.  
<0> 2013-10-08 21:11:34 SCADA-104-IDS IDS SPA-1 
Suspicious packet from the state TCP_Connected  
10.1.8.13 b997 10.6.5.158 964 
 
<0> 2013-10-08 21:15:12 SCADA-104-IDS IDS SPA-2 
Suspicious packet from the state STARTDT 
10.1.8.13 b997 10.6.5.158 964 
 
<0> 2013-10-08 21:18:42 SCADA-104-IDS IDS SPA-3 
Suspicious packet from the state Client_Tx_APDU_I 
10.1.8.13 b997 10.6.5.158 964 
Figure 5.  Alert examples in the log file 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Previous research in this area has mainly investigated 
Modbus or DNP3 protocols [7]-[9]. To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, this paper is the first to propose a stateful IDS for 
IEC 60870-5-104 SCADA networks. A novel detection state 
machine is proposed and applied to provide the stateful IDS 
for SCADA networks using IEC/104. The proposed intrusion 
detection tool, implemented by the ITACA platform, can be 
applied to monitor and detect IEC/104 traffic in SCADA 
systems. Stateful protocol analysis is recommended by NIST 
to detect anomalous behaviors where SCADA protocols are 
used. This research has directly addressed these challenges 
through the presented stateful IDS. This work contributes 
significantly to improving the cyber-security of SCADA 
systems that use the IEC/104 protocol. 
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